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CLARIFICATION OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
In his Brief of Appellee, Ron mischaracterizes the issue appealed. Ron attempts to 
limit Randy's appealed issue to "[wjhether under Banks v. Means,... Flake v. Flake,... and 
Hoggan v. Hoggan, ... a settlor of a revocable trust must revoke the trust" in order to 
completely divest a beneficiary's interest, because of language in the trust stating that the 
beneficiaries' interest are presently vested and will continue until the trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death. See Brief of the Appellee, at 6. In contrast to Ron's 
statement of the issue on appeal, it should be understood that Randy is appealing the 
correctness and applicability of Banks and its progeny. See Brief of Appellant, at 1. In 
short, one of the main objectives of this appeal is to overturn Banks and its progeny, not to 
determine the result of this controversy by reliance upon Banks, See Brief of Appellant, 
Issue I, at 14-23. 
Further, the issue presented for appeal by Randy is an issue of law, as are all 
subsidiary issues in this controversy. It should be remembered that this case was before the 
trial court on motion for summary judgment; therefore, there are no genuine issues of 
material fact, only disputes to be resolved as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FAMILY TRUST AND TRUST RESTATEMENT, BY THEIR EXPRESS 
TERMS, ALLOWED DARLENE TO COMPLETELY DIVEST RON'S 
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE TRUST BY PARTIAL REVOCATION 
In the Brief of Appellee, and without citing any supporting authority for his position, 
Ron claims the term "partial revocation" is a "novel" and "meaningless" term created by 
1 
Randy that "can only exist in a sphere in which revocation and amendment are coterminous 
[sic] in meaning, and they are not." See Brief of Appellee, at 41-42. Further, and again 
without citing any supporting legal authority, Ron seems to claim that a settlor-trustee cannot 
partially revoke a trust through an instrument entitled "Amendment". While Ron attributes 
the term "partial revocation" as novel, the term "partial revocation" predates Randy's Brief 
of Appellant and is a term recognized by Utah courts.1 
In Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 UT App 91, a settlor-trustee of a revocable trust sold two 
parcels of real property that were the primary assets of the trust. Id. at ^2. After selling the 
assets the settlor-trustee placed the proceeds into personal bank accounts and into personal 
investments. Id. The trial court held that the relevant trust was "partially revoked" as to the 
parcels of real property. Id. at ^[1. The Court of Appeals in affirming the trial courts decision 
stated as follows: 
The Trust's deed of conveyance and declaration (the Trust Declaration) is clear 
on three matters. First, it designates [the settlor-trustee] as the sole beneficiary 
of the Trust during her lifetime; second, it grants her power "to use, transfer, 
contract to sell, ... convey and in every way deal in and with the said real 
property ... without notice to or consent from any person"; and third, it grants 
her power "to modify, amend, or revoke the Trust in whole or in part in any 
manner at any time." 
1 See, e.g., Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246 (Acknowledging "partial revocation" of a 
trust is possible when the trust provides that the trust "may be revoked, in whole or in 
part, by an instrument" if the terms of the trust are complied with strictly under the 
common law or substantially under the code - further implies a quit claim deed would be 
a sufficient instrument to effectuate the partial revocation had the quit claim deed 
satisfied the trust's signature requirements); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country 
Club Mobile Estates, 632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981) (analyzing Trager v. Schwartz, 345 Mass. 
653, 189 N.E.2d 509 (1963) and determining Trager "defines the effect of a recording 
requirement specified in the trust instrument as a prerequisite to the effectiveness of an 
exercise of a power (partial revocation) clearly reserved in the trust instrument"). 
Id. at *p (emphasis added). The court then continued as follows: 
[W]here no specific method of revocation is required, she may revoke the 
Trust in "any ... method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of [her] 
intent." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 (Supp. 2004). Where [the settlor-trustee] 
sold the property of the Trust and deposited it into three subsequent personal 
accounts without designating herself as trustee or the funds as trust funds, the 
trial court properly found that she revoked the Trust respecting that property. 
See 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 115(2002) ("Where a settlor retains the power to sell 
certain property subject to a trust, and later conveys the property to someone 
else, the conveyance itself is an implied revocation of the trust, since the 
trustee and the beneficiary are divested of all interest in the property."). 
Id. at ^4 (emphasis added). 
Like Ron in the case before this court, the beneficiaries of the trust in Boulton argued 
that no revocation occurred. Id. at \5. However, the court declined to presume a revocation 
could only be evidenced by the limitations suggested by the beneficiaries. Id. Finally, the 
beneficiaries argued that because the settlor-trustee signed her name as trustee on the sale 
documents that the proceeds were intended to remain in the trust. Id. at <[[6. To this the court 
stated "where the settlor-trustee retains broad powers to revoke, the settlor-trustee's 
subsequent actions ... is more indicative of her intended characterization of the assets than is 
the signature block on the transfer instruments." Id. Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's determination that the Trust was partially revoked as to the two 
parcels of real property. Id. at ffljl, 7. 
Like the trust in Boulton, the Trust Restatement granted Darlene the right to "amend 
or revoke this Trust in whole or in part." See Trust Restatement (R. at 42, attached to Brief 
of Appellant as Exhibit H (emphasis added)). Throughout his Brief of Appellee, Ron places 
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great emphasis on the following Trust Restatement language: "The interest of the 
beneficiaries is a present interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated." Id. at 3 (R. at 43 (emphasis added)). In addition to contending the term "partial 
revocation" is a fabrication, Ron contends that such language mandates that the Trust must be 
completely revoked before divesting a beneficiary's interest. See Brief of Appellee, at 26-29. 
However, this provision does not contain any suggestion that the trust must be "completely" 
revoked before divesting a beneficiary's interest. In interpreting this provision it is 
reasonable to refer to the section of the Trust Amendment that governs revocations and is 
entitled "Revocation and Amendment" to determine how and what is necessary to revoke 
"this Trust" (emphasis added). 
As mentioned above, the Revocation and Amendment section of the Trust 
Restatement, by its express terms, states "this Trust" (the Trust Restatement) may be 
"revoked ... in whole or in part", so long as it is by "written instrument" and signed by 
Darlene. See Trust Restatement, at 2 (R. at 42, attached to Brief of Appellant as Exhibit H) 
(emphasis added). The Trust Restatement never contemplates or suggests that a "complete 
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revocation"2 is necessary to divest a beneficiary's interest, but rather only requires that the 
Trust be revoked, while providing that the Trust may be revoked in whole or in part, by 
written instrument. 
In addition, nothing in the Trust Restatement distinguishes a revocation from an 
amendment, or the processes necessary to effectuate them. In Banks, the court considered the 
issue of whether an amendment and a revocation were the same for purposes of the Banks 
trust. 2002 UT 65, %l 1. It determined that because the trust contained language stating "in 
the case of a complete revocation, all the property in the trust was also to be delivered to Ms. 
Banks" that "[Revocation is therefore a specific provision of the trust language and is not the 
same as an amendment or modification." Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, the Patterson 
Trust Restatement contains no such language or distinction, and there is no "specific 
provision" applicable only to revocation. Rather, the only parameters placed on effectuating 
2 Ron claims "the terms of the Family Trust and Restatement could not speak more 
clearly in requiring that the termination of a beneficiary's interest may only be done 
through revocation of the trust as a whole. This is not the elevation of form over 
substance; it is the necessary recognition of the substance of the terms of the Family Trust 
and Restatement." See Brief of Appellee, at 45. However, despite the fact the Trust 
Restatement could "not speak more clearly", it is interesting to note that Ron feels it 
necessary to add a clarification that the termination of a beneficiary's interest can only be 
done through revocation of the trust "as a whole". Ron's position is ambiguous at best. 
In actuality, the Trust Restatement makes no mention of revocation "as a whole" being 
necessary to terminate a beneficiary's interest but rather only provides that beneficiaries' 
interests continue until the trust is revoked and that revocation may be done in whole or in 
part. Ron felt it necessary to make said clarification throughout his Brief of Appellee. If 
such clarification is so key to understanding the terms of the trust, it stands to reason that 
the drafter would specify such a distinction if it was truly Darlene's intent to restrict 
herself from removing Ron as a beneficiary unless she "completely" revoked the "entire" 
trust. 
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an "amendment or revocation", whether in whole or in part, are that the "amendment or 
revocation" be by "written instrument" and signed by the testator. See Trust Restatement at 2 
(R. at 42, attached to Brief of Appellant as Exhibit H). Ron has not argued, nor contested, 
that the duly executed document entitled "Amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family 
Protection Trust" (the Final Amendment) was not a "written instrument." Further, while Ron 
attempts to distinguish a revocation from an amendment, he does so citing no factual or legal 
authority, nor does Ron attempt to distinguish an amendment from a partial revocation. See 
Brief of Appellee, at 27-28. 
In the case before this Court, there was no valid purpose or necessity for Darlene to 
"completely" revoke the Trust Restatement, rather than to modify or change the trust through 
a "partial revocation"; especially given the fact that in the Trust Restatement Darlene 
reserved the power "to amend or revoke the Trust in whole or in part." In the words of 
Charles M. Bennett (author of the 2004 Utah Bar Journal article entitled "Can you Amend 
that Revocable Trust? Utah Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for the Unwary", a Fellow 
in the American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, a past chair of the Utah Estate Planning 
Section, and an adjunct professor of law at the University of Utah), "an amendment that 
deletes one beneficiary and adds another is a revocation of the Trust 'in part' as to the deleted 
beneficiary's rights in the trust." While Darlene certainly could have effectuated the removal 
of Ron as a beneficiary through a complete revocation and restatement of the Trust 
Restatement, such was not the exclusive method. The plain language of the instrument 
allowed Darlene to revoke "the Trust" in whole or in part to remove Ron as a beneficiary. 
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II. RANDY PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT ON 
APPEAL AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
Contrary to Ron's repeated assertions in his Brief of Appellee, Randy properly 
preserved in the trial court the issue presented for appeal. Namely, Randy preserved the issue 
presented for appellate review as stated in Randy's Brief of Appellant. See Brief of 
Appellant, at 1. In short, the question preserved by Randy is whether Ron is entitled to an 
interest in the trust property or whether Ron was cut off by the Final Amendment (the 
"Issue"). 
"To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial 
court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 
367, ^ [17; see also Innerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31, f 10; State v. Maguire, 
1999 UT App 45, | 6 , 975 P.2d 476 (quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 
847 (Utah 1998)). The District Court then "has the opportunity to rule if the following three 
requirements are met: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority." Id.; see also Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc, 2009 UT 44 (raising a legal 
issue during a summary judgment motion based on the undisputed facts properly provides the 
court with an opportunity to rule on the issue). 
Ron alleges Randy presented "unpreserved" issues, including, "[w]hether the Utah 
Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by requiring only substantial compliance to 
amend a revocable trust" and "[w]hether the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled 
Banks by providing that a revocable trust can be amended by a settlor by any method 
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manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent." While these are points 
addressed in Randy's Brief of Appellant by reference to the Utah Trust Code §§ 75-7-605 
and -606, Ron fails to recognize that these are merely subparts of the Issue which was 
preserved for appeal. 
The Issue in large part encompasses the validity of the Banks decision and whether it 
should be overturned. Randy challenges the Banks decision in part because Utah's highest 
courts and the Utah Legislature have questioned the Banks decision. On appeal, the law is 
the law, and the statutes are relevant. It is not violative of the so-called "preservation rule" to 
present persuasive and controlling legal authority to the reviewing court. Characterizing the 
presentation of legal authority as new, unpreserved issues, as Ron attempted to do, is contrary 
to reason, would unnecessarily bind the reviewing court, and would not allow for effective 
appellate review. 
To satisfy the dictates of the preservation rule, the aforementioned Issue was raised 
and preserved by Randy in his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (R. at 422-36) and his Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support (R. at 418-19, 398-411), along with Ron's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (R. at 323-97) (which sought a judgment 
that the Final Amendment is void due to its complete divestiture of Ron as a beneficiary). 
See Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, f 17 (holding that to preserve an issue for appeal the 
issue must be raised and the trial court must be given an opportunity to rule on the issue); see 
also State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^ |6,975 P.2d 476 (quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
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Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). In these respective Motions and Memorandums the 
Issue was extensively briefed by both parties. Randy sought summary judgment declaring 
the Final Amendment valid and that the trust property is to be distributed accordingly. (R. at 
403-10,428-35). Randy sought such judgment based on, among other grounds, the language 
of the Trust documents (R. at 404-08,430-33), the trustor's intent (Id), Utah trust law (R. at 
403-10, 428-35), and equity (R. at 405-08, 431-33). Randy further argued that this case 
should be distinguished from Banks and that Banks and its progeny should be overruled. (R. 
at 408-10, 433-35). 
As required by Searle, the Issue was raised with the trial court in a timely fashion, the 
Issue was specifically raised, and both parties introduced relevant legal authority and 
submitted supporting evidence in their motions and memoranda. See Searle, 2001 UT App 
367, |17. The trial court considered Randy's and Ron's respective arguments relating to the 
Issue and, on November 30, 2009, issued its Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendants' Cross 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. at 622-29). The trial court stated that the Court 
had "reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting 
documentation", "held a hearing on the matters", "considered all of the arguments", and were 
"fully advised in the premises", before making the Ruling. (R. at 622). In this Ruling, the 
trial court determined the Final Amendment was invalid and granted Ron's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 628). Therefore, because the Issue was raised at the trial court 
level and because the trial court had an opportunity to rule on the Issue, the Issue was 
adequately preserved for appeal. Further, Randy showed that the issue was preserved for 
9 
appeal by citation to the record in his primary brief. See Brief of Appellant at 1. The Issue is 
the sole issue presented for appeal and it should be reviewed as a matter of law. 
As stated above, in large part the issue presented for appeal and before this Court, is 
whether the case of Banks v. Means, and its progeny cases, is good law. Based on the 
legislative developments, the subsequent case law, and the Utah trust law contained in 
Randy's Brief, Randy's position is that Banks is no longer good law. This is an issue 
presented that was clearly preserved, and the main issue Randy is asking this Court to review. 
The appellate briefing process is in place to allow the parties to present the law to the 
reviewing courts so the reviewing courts can determine the propriety of the decision below. 
Through the briefing process, Ron has had the opportunity to respond to the law contained in 
the Brief of Appellant and present counter arguments. This is especially relevant and useful 
given this appeal is interlocutory in nature and an appeal from a summary judgment, thereby 
requiring this court to determine whether the trial court correctly determined that Ron is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
To determine whether Banks is good law, and to determine whether Ron has an 
interest in the trust property or whether he was cut off by the Final Amendment, this Court 
should review all legal authority available to it, including legislation and all legal authority 
presented in Randy's Brief of Appellant. 
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III. THE CRIMINAL ACTS RON COMMITTED AGAINST HIS MOTHER, 
DARLENE, ARE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRUST 
SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHANGES TO THE 
TRUST MADE BY DARLENE IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHE DISCOVERED RON'S 
CRIMINAL ACTS 
A. The trial court never found that the evidence of Ron's "Elder Abuse" and 
"Exploitation of an Elder" against his mother was irrelevant 
Throughout Ron's brief of Appellee, he inappropriately and inaccurately asserts that 
Randy's Brief of Appellant contained irrelevant evidence regarding the criminal acts Ron 
committed against his mother, Darlene, immediately before Darlene caused Ron to be 
removed as a beneficiary of her trust. Importantly, however, nowhere in Ron's brief did he 
dispute the facts of his criminal acts as laid out in Randy's Brief of Appellant and, therefore, 
only the relevance of Ron's felonious activities against his mother is at issue. The extrinsic 
evidence of Ron's criminal activities was never ruled irrelevant by the trial court and such 
extrinsic evidence is clearly relevant to Darlene's intent in making the final changes to her 
trust. 
As noted in the trial court's Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendants' Cross Motions for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Ron did file a motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Randy 
Patterson based on evidentiary arguments. See Ruling, fn. 3 (R. at 625, attached to Brief of 
Appellant at Exhibit C). In its Ruling, the trial court stated as follows regarding to motion to 
strike: 
In reviewing the Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson, 
and given the parties' stipulation to limit the issues pertaining to their cross 
motions for partial summary judgment and the relevant Utah appellate case law 
on such issues, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the information within 
the affidavit is largely irrelevant to the Court's analysis. However, the Court 
11 
finds that the plaintiffs motion to strike is rendered moot by the Court's ruling 
on the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. 
Id. 
Nowhere in the Ruling, or elsewhere in the Record, did the court specifically rule that 
the proffered evidence regarding Ron's criminal actions against his mother was irrelevant. 
At best, the court stated that information contained in Randy's Supplemental and Corrected 
Affidavit was "largely" irrelevant, without specifying what evidence in the Affidavit was 
being referred to. Further, the court never made a ruling on the issue because it found Ron's 
motion to strike "moot" due to its ruling on Ron's motion for partial summary judgment. The 
trial court even went so far in a later footnote as to imply the relevancy of the information 
regarding Ron's criminal acts in an appeal situation when it stated the following: 
The Court notes that the defendants' inclusion of additional facts pertaining to 
Darlene Patterson's intent and the equity of a finding that the Final 
Amendment is invalid are largely irrelevant to the Court's analysis of the 
issues under existing Utah appellate case law and the Court's interpretation of 
the Family Trust's plain language. See Banks ... Flake ... Hoggan. While the 
defendants have requested the Court disregard this case law as bad precedent, 
the Court declines such request. This Court is bound to follow the precedent 
of the Utah appellate courts and the defendants' attempt to change this 
precedent is more appropriate on appeal. 
Id. at fn. 5. 
While the veracity of Ron's criminal conduct was undisputed and, thus, should have 
been considered on summary judgment, it is only irrelevant if such facts are ignored and 
Banks is blindly affirmed. 
Further, even if the admissibility of the evidence regarding Ron's felonious activities 
is in controversy, Randy complied with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure rule 24(e), to the 
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extent possible, by citing to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(e) provides "If reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at 
which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected." As mentioned above, 
this appeal is from an interlocutory ruling on summary judgment motion, and the "evidence 
in controversy" was neither received nor rejected. Further, the accuracy of these facts was 
never disputed. Therefore, to satisfy Rule 24(e) Randy referred to the record where the 
evidence was identified. See Brief of Appellant, at 9-10. 
B. If it is determined by this Court that the trial court found evidence of Ron's crimes 
against his mother was irrelevant, the trial court abused its discretion in making said 
determination, and this Court should determine that said evidence is relevant 
As stated in Ron's Brief of Appellee, "Utah trust law has always focused its inquiry 
on the intent of the trustor, Leggroan v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749 
(1951)." See Brief of Appellee, at 44; see also Flake, 71 P.3d at 594; Kline v. Utah Dep't of 
Health, 776 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, testator intent is a key inquiry and, 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence, any evidence relating to or showing testator intent is 
necessarily relevant, and meets Utah's minimalistic relevance standard. 
According to Utah law, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401; see also Ferguson 
v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49. Relevant evidence is admissible; irrelevant evidence 
is not admissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. Further, the standard for determining the relevancy of 
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evidence is "very low," and even evidence with the "slightest probative value" is relevant. 
State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, \3A\ State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ffif 12,16 (quoting Edward L. 
Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-2 (1996)); see also State v. Colwell, 2000 
UT 8, If 27; Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, fflf 26-27. 
"The question of whether evidence is admissible can be either a question of discretion, 
which [appellate courts] review for abuse of discretion, or a question of law, which [appellate 
courts] review for correctness. State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, ^|29. When a trial court is 
required to balance factors to determine the admissibility of evidence, the appropriate 
standard of review is generally abuse of discretion or reasonability. Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. 
White, 2002 UT App 1, ^ [12; see also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 
^}8,977 P.2d 508. If error is found, reversal is appropriate in those cases where, after review 
of all the evidence, it appears that 'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached.'" Id. (quoting UtahDep'tofTransp. v. 6200 South 
Assocs., 872 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted)). 
Utah case law is clear, as cited by Ron, in making the testator's intent a key inquiry 
and the focus of Utah courts in interpreting a trust document. Therefore, any evidence 
relating to or corroborating the testator's intent is appropriately considered in the court's 
analysis and interpretation of the relevant trust documents. Consideration of Darlene's intent 
is relevant in determining Ron's claimed entitlement to a share of the trust property. 
Fortunately, Darlene made her intent very clear through her execution of the Final 
Amendment that she felt she had provided sufficiently for Ron during her life and that upon 
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her death she desired that Ron would take none of the trust property.3 See Final Amendment, 
at 2 (R. at 59, attached to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit I) ("I [Darlene] have intentionally not 
provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already 
properly provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate"). 
While it would be difficult for Darlene to state her intent any clearer, her intent to 
remove Ron as a beneficiary of the Trust, is further corroborated by the undisputed evidence 
that the Final Amendment was executed on May 30, 2006, soon after it was discovered by 
Darlene that Ron had unlawfully used Darlene's credit card without authorization to make 
personal purchases and that Ron had stolen $52,936.53 from Darlene; acts which ultimately 
led to Ron's later conviction of the felony crimes of "Elder Abuse" and "Exploitation of an 
Elder". See Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson at ffi[4-5, (R. at 474, 
attached to Brief of Appellant as Exhibit E). 
It is a fact of consequence that Darlene intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary of the 
Trust. Pursuant to Utah law, all evidence that has any tendency to make the existence of said 
fact of consequence more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence is 
relevant, is admissible, and should be considered by this court in its determination of Ron's 
3 Ron would have this Court believe that because Darlene did not sign a "revocation of 
trust" and afterwards form a new trust incorporating the provisions of the trust as 
amended by the Final Amendment, that her intent when she signed the Final Amendment 
on May 30, 2006, was not to remove Ron as a beneficiary of her trust estate and that 
because she did not sign a revocation and new trust that she did not "serious [ly] 
contemplate] her decision, despite the fact she made an appointment with an attorney, 
instructed the attorney to remove Ron as a beneficiary, and signed a Final Amendment 
evidencing such. See Brief of Appellee at 49. 
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entitlement, or lack thereof, to his claimed share of the trust property. Ron abused and 
exploited his mother, Darlene. As a result Darlene intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary 
of her trust. If this Court determines that the trial court found evidence of Ron's felonious 
criminal activities against his mother was irrelevant or inadmissible, this Court should 
determine the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in doing so. 
IV. UTAH TRUST CODE SECTIONS 75-7-605 AND -606 ARE DETERMINATIVE 
PROVISIONS OF LAW AND PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY TO THE ISSUE 
BEFORE THIS COURT 
As briefed by Ron, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105(2) states, "Except as specifically 
provided in this chapter, the terms of a trust prevail over any provision of the chapter except: 
..." (emphasis added). Ron interprets this provision to mean that because the Trust 
Restatement has a term that addresses revocation or amendment, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 
is wholly inapplicable and, therefore, not determinative of the issue before this court. See 
Brief of Appellee at 11-12, 39-40. 
As stated in the Uniform Trust Code's4 Prefatory Note, "[m]ost of the Uniform Trust 
Code consists of default rules that apply only if the terms of the trust fail to address or 
insufficiently cover a particular issue." See Uniform Trust Code, Prefatory Note (2005). 
According to the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605, the Trust Restatement failed 
to address or "sufficiently" cover revocation and amendment, as applicable to the Issue, 
because the terms of the Trust Restatement did not provide an exclusive method for 
revocation and amendment. 
4 The Uniform Trust Code has been enacted in the State of Utah. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 states, in relevant part, as follows: 
(3) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust: 
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the 
trust; or 
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided 
in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by: 
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or 
specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed according to 
the terms of the trust; or 
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the 
settlor's intent. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Uniform Trust Code's Official Comment explained this section's application and 
purpose as follows: 
Under subsection ([3]), the settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust by 
substantial compliance with the method specified in the terms of the trust or by 
a later will or codicil or any other method manifesting clear and convincing 
evidence of the settlor's intent. Only if the method specified in the terms of the 
trust is made exclusive is use of the other methods prohibited. Even then, a 
failure to comply with a technical requirement, such as required notarization, 
may be excused as long as compliance with the method specified in the terms 
of the trust is otherwise substantial. 
See Uniform Trust Code § 602, Official Comment (2005) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, pursuant to the plain language of the statute and the above-emphasized 
language, the terms of the trust only override the provisions of this section if there is a 
declared method of revocation and amendment in the terms of the trust and such declared 
method is made explicitly exclusive by the trust's terms. Id. As noted above, even if there is 
a declared method made explicitly exclusive, revocation and amendment may be effectuated 
by substantial compliance with the trust's terms. Id. 
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Clearly, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 contemplates application to a trust already 
containing revocation or amendment terms. The language allowing "substantial compliance" 
with a term, presupposes that a term already exists to substantially comply with. Further, 
subsection (b) contemplates application to all trusts, including those with express revocation 
or amendment terms, exclusive revocation or amendment terms, non-exclusive revocation or 
amendment terms, and no revocation or amendment terms. Therefore, Ron's argument that 
this section is completely inapplicable because the Trust Restatement contains a provision 
addressing revocation and amendment must fail. 
Rather, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 is applicable to the Issue before this Court and 
should be considered in this Court's analysis and interpretation of the Trust Restatement and 
the Final Amendment. Darlene's Trust Restatement contains a section entitled "Revocation 
and Amendment", providing, in relevant part, as follows: 
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this Trust in whole or in part. Such 
amendment or revocation shall be by written instrument and shall be effective 
upon the signing thereof by me without notice to any successor Trustee. 
See Trust Restatement, Art. II (R. at 42, attached to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit H). 
Because the Trust Restatement contains terms governing modification of its terms, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a)-(b), the Trust can be modified by "substantial 
compliance" with said terms and, because the Trust Restatement does not make any method 
of modification the exclusive method, the Trust can be modified by "any other method 
manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent." See Utah Code Ann. § 75-
7-605(3)(a)-(b). 
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Therefore, it is specifically provided in Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a)-(b), in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105, that the cited trust code provisions are 
applicable to and govern revocable trusts, even if said revocable trust contains terms 
governing modification. While Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a)-(b) may not "override" the 
terms of the Trust, it certainly coexists with the terms of the Trust to resolve troublesome 
ambiguities. 
Because the Trust Restatement contains terms governing revocation or amendment, 
pursuant to Utah trust law, Darlene was entitled to modify her trust by substantially 
complying with the express modification terms or by any other method evidence her clear 
intent to modify the trust. Darlene did this through her execution of the Final Amendment. 
In the alternative, even if this Court determines the Trust Restatement sufficiently 
covers the issue of revocation and amendment and concludes that its terms completely 
override Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605, this Court may still exercise its discretion in giving 
effect to Darlene's intent in executing the Final Amendment through its reformation powers 
granted by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415. It states, in its entirety, as follows: 
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform 
the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected 
by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement. 
This provision is a mandatory rule as per Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105(2)(d), and this power 
prevails over any terms of the Trust Restatement. Reformation allows the court to modify the 
terms of a trust, as necessary, to effectuate the testator's intent. 
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If the Final Amendment is declared invalid, the terms of the Trust Restatement would 
misstate Darlene's true intention and, therefore, constitute a mistake of expression. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-7-415 applies to mistakes of expression. "A mistake of expression occurs 
when the terms of the trust misstate the settlor's intention, fail to include a term that was 
intended to be included, or include a term that was not intended to be included." See 
Uniform Trust Code § 415, official comment (2005). It is clear and convincing that Darlene 
intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary of her trust estate by her execution of the Final 
Amendment. The fully executed Final Amendment states, in relevant part, "I have 
intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since 
I have already properly provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate." 
See Final Amendment at 2 (R. at 59, attached to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit I) (emphasis 
added). To effectuate Darlene's intent, this Court must determine the Final Amendment to 
be valid or reform the terms of the Trust Restatement to remove Ron as a beneficiary. 
In short, if this Court determines that the Final Amendment was invalid due to "Banks 
deficiencies", it should determine that Darlene's execution of the Final Amendment 
(especially given the surrounding circumstances of Ron's criminal abuse and exploits against 
Darlene) was clear and convincing evidence of her intent to remove Ron as a beneficiary of 
the Patterson Trust. After making such a determination, this Court should then exercise its 
statutory power of reformation and reform the Trust Restatement to reflect Darlene's clear 
intent. 
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V. EQUITY REQUIRES THIS COURT TO VALIDATE THE FINAL 
AMENDMENT AND TO ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRUST ESTATE 
ACCORDING TO THE FINAL AMENDMENT'S TERMS 
Under the circumstances of the case before this Court, it would be inequitable in every 
respect for the court to award Ron an interest in the trust estate other than that which was left 
to him under the Final Amendment, especially given the fact Darlene made her intentions to 
remove Ron as a trust beneficiary unquestionably clear. 
As argued in Randy's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Counter Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment at 10-11 (R. at 407-08), under general contract law, "an 
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract 
so expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to 
be given it." Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, [^19. 
Darlene Patterson discovered Ron's criminal activities and then prepared and executed 
the Final Amendment, which was clearly intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary of 
Darlene's Trust. Ron continues his misconduct even after Darlene's death, by asking Utah 
courts to disregard his prior criminal acts, ignore the changes his mother rightfully made to 
the Family Trust by way of the Final Amendment, and interpret the trust language without 
regard to his mother's final modification and expressed intent. 
Unfortunately, the trial court's decision to apply Banks and its progeny has the effect 
of ignoring Ron's misconduct and rewarding his wrongdoing. Banks, Flake, andHoggan 
should be overturned. After much judicial, legislative, and scholarly questioning, now is the 
time to do so. The Court in Hoggan noted as follows: 
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Language asserting that beneficiaries have a "present interest" or a "presently 
vested interest" in a trust has apparently become common within trusts drafted 
in Utah. We suspect that drafters include such language with the intent of 
warding off potential challenges to the trust on grounds that it is illusory. See 
Banks, 2002 UT 65, PP 12-13, 52 P.3d 1190. Unfortunately, such phrases have 
been the focus of recent litigation and have the potential to produce results not 
within the contemplation of the drafters of trusts or their clients. Indeed, the 
potential for confusion is great because in many living trusts, like the one at 
issue here, the beneficiaries have no immediate right of possession or 
enjoyment of the trust property. In such instances, the insertion of language 
proclaiming that the beneficiaries have a "present interest" simply contradicts 
the operative terms of the trust. See Black's Law Dictionary 816 (7th ed. 1999) 
(defining a present interest as "[a] property interest in which the privilege of 
possession or enjoyment is present and not merely future; an interest entitling 
the holder to immediate possession"). Similarly, trusts in which the settlor 
retains the right to amend or revoke the instrument do not convey "presently 
vested rights" to beneficiaries because their interests are contingent upon the 
settlor not amending or revoking the trust. See id. at 1557 (defining the term 
"vested" as a "consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not 
contingent; unconditional; absolute"). 
The impetus for including such phrases within trust agreements appears to 
originate, unfortunately, from our holding that a trust is invalid unless the 
beneficiary's interest vests during the settlor's lifetime. Alexander v. Zion's Sav. 
Bank & Trust Co., 2 Utah 2d 317, 273 P.2d 173, 174 (Utah 1954), affd on 
reh'g, 4 Utah 2d 90,287 P.2d 665 (Utah 1955). But see Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts § 59 cmt. c (1959) ("A provision in the terms of the trust under which 
interests of the beneficiaries do not vest until a future time is not invalid unless 
such interests may not vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities . . . 
."). In an apparent effort to uphold prior precedent while at the same time 
avoiding the invalidation of countless trusts intended to serve as substitutes for 
wills, we later said that such trusts created vested interests that were subject to 
divestment. Horn v. First Sec. BankofUtah} N.A., 548 P.2d 1265,1267 (Utah 
1976). Although the term "vested interest subject to divestment" is more of an 
oxymoron than a meaningful legal term, over the decades this phrase has been 
used by this court to uphold trusts in which the beneficiaries' interests were not 
vested under the traditional meaning of the term. See Banks, 2002 UT 65, P 13, 
52 P.3d 1190; Groesbeckv. Groesbeck (In re Estate ofGroesbeck), 935 P.2d 
1255, 1257-58 (Utah 1997). 
We hereby disavow the use of this phrase and the antiquated and now widely 
discredited rule articulated in Alexander that gave rise to it. We agree with the 
analysis of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which advocates the 
abandonment of such confusing and disingenuous terminology in favor of an 
open recognition that there is no requirement that a beneficiary's interest be 
either present or vested: 
Issues are obscured and litigation invited by confusing or unsound dicta 
often found in opinions that attempt to explain why something is or is not a 
present trust. Asking whether something is a "trust" or a "mere agency" is 
at best question begging. So is the suggestion in many opinions that, in 
order to uphold a disposition, a court must find a "present" or "vested" 
interest in one or more beneficiaries other than the settlor; in fact these 
statements are untrue unless they mean, simply, "presently existing" 
interests. And assertions that a settlor must relinquish "dominion and 
control" over the property are merely erroneous dicta. 
These statements confuse the issue, and maybe the reader, ignoring the 
reality that these very courts regularly and properly find valid trusts where 
settlors have retained complete control, and where the other beneficiaries 
usually, if drafting is competent, have only future interests that are not only 
defeasible (by revocation or amendment) but also "contingent" upon 
surviving the settlor and maybe other events as w e l l . . . . 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 reporter's notes, cmt. b (2003). 
Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, fn 2. (emphasis added). Thus, this Court has previously acknowledged 
that the language upon which Ron relies ("The interest of the beneficiaries is a present 
interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated"5) "produce[s] results 
not within the contemplation of the drafters of trusts or their clients", is included in trusts for 
the purpose of "warding off potential challenges to the trust on grounds that it is illusory", 
"originate[s], unfortunately, from [the Utah Supreme Court's] holding that a trust is invalid 
unless the beneficiary's interest vests during the settlor's lifetime", is "oxymoron[ic]", and is 
5 Ron argues throughout his Brief of Appellee that the language "shall continue until this 
Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death" is not necessary to achieve the 
purpose of preventing a trust from being deemed illusory, however, the Hoggan footnote 
is referring to a clause in the Hoggan trust containing such language and the Hoggan 
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expressly "disavowed]" by this Court. Id. This Court has already acknowledged that Banks 
only makes sense in regard to the illusory trust doctrine and this Court's 1954 Alexander 
ruling that a trust is invalid unless a beneficiary's interest vests during the testator's lifetime. 
This Court acknowledged in Hoggan that the troublesome language at issue has been used 
unnecessarily only for purposes of avoiding potential challenges to the validity of the trust 
based on the illusory trust doctrine announced in Alexander and further developed in Horn. 
However, in Hoggan, it was unnecessary to explicitly overrule Banks because, as pointed out 
by Ron in his Brief of Appellee at 33, "the rule of Banks did not apply because Jack Hoggan 
had not been completely divested of his interest in the trust" and, therefore, the amendment 
was validated and the intent of the testator was followed. However, the Patterson Trust 
dispute provides this Court the opportunity to overturn Banks, distance itself from the 
uoxymoron[ic]" and troublesome language provided to the legal practitioner community in 
Horn, and conform Utah trust law to the current state of the law as set forth in the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts. 
This Court should finally and completely overrule Banks, distance itself from its 
linguistic suggestion in Horn, and order the distribution of Darlene's estate pursuant to the 
Final Amendment. Additionally, this Court can resolve and prevent the unintended 
consequences that have arisen and will continue to arise in countless Utah trusts due to this 
Court's application of the illusory trust doctrine outlined in Alexander and justified in Horn. 
This Court has already taken the first step by explicitly overruling Alexander and 
court makes no such distinction. See Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, f l 1. 
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"disavowing]" the use of the phrase "vested subject to divestment" originally suggested in 
Horn. See Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, fn. 2. Now is the time for this Court to take the next step 
and specifically overrule Banks, which is a creature of Alexander's illusory trust doctrine and 
the linguistic requirements enunciated in Horn. To do otherwise unquestionably "exalts form 
over substance" as it would completely disregard Darlene's intent and justification in 
executing her Final Amendment, and produce an inequitable result. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Denying Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be 
reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to uphold and 
enforce the Final Amendment. 
DATED this 5 J day of August, 2010 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
fames C. J6nKins 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Petitioner, and 
Appellant 
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